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SARTRE'S.WAR DJARlES:
PRELUDE AND POSTSCRIPT
1he War D;ar;es (Les Carnets de La dröLe de guerre) were aprelude for
Sartre, and for usthey are a postscript. The Diar;es are a medley. They
combine, usually not in clearly distinct sections, narrative, reactions to people,
to public events, and to books, introspective self-analysis and philosophical
discourse. They are a unity only in that they are the recorded Iife of one man
over aperiod of lessthan four months, but they are incomplete. They are
physically incomplete; Sartre's notebooks originally covered the months from
mid-September 1939 through March 1940 (with a few desultory entries after
that), but only those for most of November-December and February-March have
come to light and been published. They are designedly incomplete in two
respects: Sartre wrote in them only at his post of duty and not when he was on
leave. And he has deliberately omitted details conceming his relations with other
people which are essential if we are to understand keypoints in the Diar;es.
Fortunately the published letters written by Sartre atthe same date to Simone de
Beauvoir fill in the background, and I will be making use of these here. I
Given this situation, it would be possible for us to look on the Diar;es as
a collection of disparate data which we might use to establish stages in the
development of Sartre's philosophy or to augment what we already knew of his
biography. Two significant revelations, however, compet us as philosophers to
recognize that the D;ar;es offer more than an early rough sketch ofwhat became
I All translations are my own, but I am providing referencel for the DIaries both for the French
text and for the English translation: C for the French text and WD for the English. lean-Paul Sartre,
us CamelSde la drolede guerre. November 1939-March 1940, ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre (paris:
Gallimard, 1983). The War Diaries 01 Jean-Paul Sal1re. November 1939/March 1940, tranl. by
Quintin Hoare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). At the time this paper was written, no
translation ofthe letters had yet appeared. ullres au Caslor el tl quelques aulres, ed. by Simone de
Beauvoir. Volt I, 1926-1939; Volt 11, 1940-1963 (paris: Oallimard, 1983).
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Ithe philosophy of Being and NOlhingness and should prevent us also from
lattempting to isolate the philosophical matter from the personal self-reflection.
First, the Diaries testify absolutely to the fact that Sartre's initial intention was
10 work out an ethies; tbe ontology was aneillary so far as his original purpose
was eoncemed. Second, the project to formulate amoral theory was, in Sartre's
mind, inextricably bound up witb his seareb for authentie personal morality to
serve as a guide for bis own life. I will speak briefly about the first point and
then more at length regarding the second.
In early December Sartre writes to Beauvoir that he has been thinking
about ethical questions since his mobilization in September. Now, he says, "I
have seen that ethics which 1 have been practicing for three months without
making a theory out of it-quite contrary to my usual habit. " (I. p. 455) He goes
on to quote to her from a passage he had just written in the Diaries.
I believe that I now undentand and leel what a tNe ethic. i.. I aee the conneclioßl
belween metaphy.ic. and values, humaniam aod 1C0m, our ablOlute frcedom and our
condilion in a Iife unique and lirnited by dcalh, our inaubatantiality a. a beinl that i.
withoul God and i. not ilS own aulhor, our sclf-aufficienl independence a. an
individualand our hisloricily. (C, pp. 121-122. WD, p. 95)
In tbe letter he adds, "All of this naturally revolves around ideas about freedom,
life, and authenticity. "
A bit later Sartre teils Beauvoir that he has worked out a metaphysies
wbich is a natural accompaniment for his ethics. At this stage he uses
·metaphysies, " not "ontology" for his own theory, apparently because he wanted
to contrast it with the philosophy of Husserl and of Heidegger.
Wha' we wise little phenomenologisla were doing up till now was ontology. You
searched for the eascnce of consciouanesl with Husserl or for the being of exislents
with Heidegger. Dut melaphysica ia an wOnlic. WYou pUl your handl in the dough.
You no longer abißt about essences (which givea an eidetic-scienceaof poaaiblca-or
an onlology) but of aetua. eonefCle, liven exiatcncel, and you alk why it ia like thai.
Thia is what the Greek philosophen were up lo-there ia a sun, why il the a sun?
Instead of "Wbat ia the essence of an pOlsible auna, solar eaaence?W Or WWhat ia the
being of sun?" (0. pp. 49-50)
Sartre is not after questions of origin; of course. The ·why· questions he will
raise will be answered by a description of the purposive activity of an individual
.consciousness in the everyday world. Laler in Being and Nothingness he wisely,
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I think, realized th~t ontology was what he was doing after all, and he allocated
to metaphysics only hypothetical though legitimate speculation as to the probable
evolution of consciousness and the Iike. In 1940 he worried for a while lest what
he was offering was warmed over Heidegger, but this doubt was quickly
dispelled. He wrote to Beauvoir, "I believe that what I am doing is interesting
and new; it bears no resemblance to HusserI's philosophy nor to Heidegger's
nor to anybody's. Rather it would represent all my old ideas on perception and
existence, ideas stillbom for lack of any technique but ideas which I can now
develop with alJ of phenomenologicaJ and existentialist technique. " (11. p. 51)
Three days later Sartre pinpointed the unifying element in his metaphysics.
1 am retaining all of Husserl'. beina-in-the-world, and yet 1 arrive at an absolute
neo-realism (in which 1 integrate Gestalt theory). -What a confused mesl!, - (quelle
salade] you will say. Hut not at all. It is very carefuUy ordered around the idea of
Notbingnes80r pure event at Ihe healt of beilll.2 (11. p. S6)
The Diaries show that Sartre developed bis crucial concept of Neanl in reaction
to and against Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's use of the notion of anguish or
dread at nothing and Heidegger's description of the world as suspended in
nothingness. The old stillbom ideas presumably refer to his student interest in
contingency and to the view of consciousness as a void in being, which Sartre
mentioned in a letter he wrote in 1925.3 The concept of Nothingness as a lack
in the very being of consciousness Sartre held to be the decisive cleavage
between himself and his predecessors as weil as the unifying foundation of his
own philosophy. I made everything fall into place. Quotations chosen almost at
random from a single passage in the Diaries show this centripetal force in
action.
2nte published French text reads evenemenl, and the nolion of the emergence of consciousness
with its nothingness as an evcnt that happens to Beinl is orthodox Sartre. I wonder, however, if the
manuscript might possibly have read evenlemenl, an airing or ventilation (i.e., an emptincls) .t the
healt of being, which would, Ilhink, fit his thought at this stage even better.
~ichel Conlat and Michel Rybalka, Les EcrllS de Sal1re. Chronologie, bibliographie
commenlee (paris: Gallimard, 1970, p. 23.
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Anguiah before Nothingneas, with Heideuer7 Anguish before freedom, with
Kierkegllrd7 To my mind, il'. ODe Ind the aame thing, for freedom i. the Ippelring
of Nothingness in the world.... Freedom efTeella diaconlinuily, il i. a Npture of
contact. It i. the foundation of tranacendcnec bceauae bcyond what i., it ein projcet
WMI i.s nOI yel. ... I cannot commit myaelf bcclulC the future of freedom i.
nothingneas . . . bcclulC my preaenl, bccome pa.., will be nihilated and pul out of
play by my free preaenl-to-comc.... ThclC charaeteristica of freedom Ire no other
thao those of consciousness.... If Nothingncaa ia introduccd in10 the world by man,
anguish bcfore Nothingocaa ia nothing other than anguiah before freedom or, if you
prefer, the anguish of freedom before itlelf. . . . Anguish ia indccd the experience of
Nothingness, Ind it ia not thereby a paychologica. phenomenon. 11 i. an exiatcnlial
Itroclure of human realily; il i. nothin, other than freedom beeoming cooacioul of
itself la being ita own nothingne... (C, pp. 166-167. WD, p. 132)
And SO on in terms by now familiar to all of uso
Here Sartre bas ancbored his metaphysics in tbe stream of
existential-pbenomenology. Some pages earlier be bad arrived at the view of a
nihilating, self-making consciousness via the traditional ethical concems of
self-fulfillment, value, and responsibility. I will quote a few illustrative
sentences:
An elhics i. a system of ends. Then 10 what end oughl human reality 10 acl? Thc only
aOlwer: to itself al end. . . . An end can bc po.itcd only by a bcing which il ita own
poaaibilitics; that ia, which projCCla itaelf lOward thCIC pouibililiel in thc future...
. Human realily ia of an existentill typc lUch thal ita exillellCe conatitutea it in the
fonn of a value to be realized by ita freedom.... [lt) exi.ta a. a plan for itaelf [a
desse;n de so;). 11 is this self. . . . (al that which awaita it in the future to bc realized
by ita freedom) which ia value. There exista no other value than human realily from
its plan. Withoul the world, no value. Eabica ia a Ipecifically human thing; it would
have 00 meaning for angela or for God.... [Human realily) motivatc. itaelfwithout
being ita own foundatioo. What we caU ill freedom ia the facllhat it ia never anything
without motivating itaclf to be it. Nothing can ever happen to it from outside. . . .
The fact that there is a conaciousncss which motivates ita own structure is irreducible
aod absurd. (C, pp. 136-139. WO, pp. 107-109)
I desist at tbis point. To summarize the philosophical content of the
Diaries would be to outline Being anti NOlhingness. Indeed at one time Sartre
thought he might excerptthese passages for separate publication. They lack the
closely reasoned argument to support certain of bis conclusions; for example,
the attempt in the Introduction of Being and NOlhingness to prove that his view
of consciousness avoids the pitfalls of botb idealism and realism. And tbe
diseussion of bad faith was in one of the missing notebooks for January. But
most of the later work is there and not just in embryo. Wbat we have is elose
to a condensed first draft4 except for tbe intrusion of details of army Iife,
autobiographical material, and personal introspection. The last two, while
extraneous to Being and Nothingness, in one sense, are directly relevant in
another, for they show Sartre in the process of formulating theories to explain
what he had observed in bis own and other' behavior, thereby shedding light on
his intentions in the later work. The ties to its author are no longer obvious in
the way that they are in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, for example, but
they were there at the start. Virtually everything in Being a,uI Nothingness ean
be shown to be rooted in the autobiographical refections, but I will concentrate
here on two major themes in the Diaries-authenticity and love.
Authenticity
Authenticity is not a key concept in Being and Nothingness; it is partially
replaced by the notion of good faith, but even this is more implied tban
diseussed. Authenticity is a central idea in the Diar;es. It is the goal of Sartre's
moral theory. He speaks of it as a "metaphysical value," the "only absolute, "
and he offers ethics based on it as the sole alternative to moral codes founded
on duty, resignation, or complacency. I think the case can be made that it is
equivalent to what Sartre later called good faith; if so, he regarded it as both
possible and difficult. In the Diar;es Sartre sought to achieve ~ authentieity
personally while trying to explain it philosophically. He encountered pitfalls in
both pursuits.
Sartre's notion of authenticity embraced two not entirely compatible sets
of ideas, one deriving from the earlier preoccupationsthat had culminated in The
Transcendence 0/ the Ego, the other leading him to break new ground. In each
ease be approaches a positive view after considering fonns of its opposite,
inauthenticity. Sartre's first discussion of inauthenticity is applied Heidegger. He
amuses himself by describing his companion Pieter as an "angel of
inauthenticity" who exemplifies perfectly the avoidance ofpersonal responsibility
by taking refuge in the social, impersonal "one" or das Mall. (C, pp. 22ff. WD,
4ff taken too literally, this statement may be a trine, but not very much exaggerated. It certainly
expresses my feeling in first reading the Diarles.
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pp. IIff.) Sartre prides bimself on being different. Whereas Pieter sees everyone
as a type, acting in whatever way is natural to bis character, Sartre claims that
he has never feit any solidarity with bis self; bis consciousness has never
suffered from adhesions with a self. He confesses to an acute anxiety if anyone
points to seeming evidence of the pennanency of Sartre's ego. (C, p. 19. WD,
p. 8) He worries lest the war might find him keeping a rendezvous with the
same self that was there at it start. (C, p. 270. WD, p. 222) Such feelings had
led him in The Transcendence 0/ 'he Ego simply to eject the self from
cODsciousness like a "nosy visitor. - (C, p. 393. WD, p. 324 He remains true to
the view that the ego is the construct of consciousness, not part of its structure,
and he wants to live this detachment as openness to change. He does, to be sure,
speak of a -fidelity to self, - but this means simply that he will not He to bimself.
Stoics, he points out, seek to gain equanimity by demeaning the object which
might cause them griefe But Sartre, when he jealously fears that he has lost bis
current love, Tania, to someone else, admits to bimself that he would be
deprived of something precious. -Authenticity demands that we be a little
tearfuU- (C, p. 69. WD, p. 51) Yet in a half-serious statement to Beauvoir
Sartre remarkS that it is hard for him to be authentic since he clings so closelY
to bis love for her. (11. p. 76) Tbe fact is that for a time Sartre identified
authenticity with pure, unreflective spontaneity in wbicb one was caugbt up
entirely in immediate feeling. And since be feit incapable of letting bimself go
in this way, he concluded that he was not autbentic. By some strange reversal
Sartre, wbile retaining bis belief that consciousness is not identical with the ego,
feit that bis awareness of this basic freedom precluded authenticity. The latter
required that one be wholly given to an experience whereas the price of freedom
was that one is always outside. (C, p. 405. WD, p. 334) He writes,
It'. tNe, I am not authentic. With everythin,l feell know that I feel it even before
feelinl it. And then, wholly occupied with defininl it and thinkin. it, I no IonIer
more than halfway feel it. My ,reateat pauions are ooly nervoul impulses. The reit
of the time I hasten over my feeling, then I develop it in WOrdl, I prell a little here,
I force a little there, aOO behold an exemplary constNcaed feelinl fit to be inserted
in abound book. (C, p. 82. WD, p. 61)
Sartre goes on to say that tbis sort of exploitative self-sclUtiny is his most basic
reality, and he is a bit weary of it. We might be inclined to dismiss tbis kind of
thing as typical of writers, but Sartre, who sounds this note witb distressing
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frequency, alternates between the conviction that something is missing in him
(a view that is certainly not consistent with his philosophy) and the idea that he
is somehow not authentically realizing himself as a spontaneous, nonreflective
consciousness.
Influenced by such feelings, Sartre played an unadmirable part in a most
unsavoury episode. Passing judgement on himself afterward, he said that it was
out of this experience that he developed his theory of authenticity, obviously
seeing in his own behavior a negative example. (Lettres, II. p. 131) But it was
the unfamiliar satisfaction of feeling strongly and acting recklessly in the face
of all cautionary reflection that 100 him more and more deeply into it, as though
he took delight in doing what he condemned. The incident reads like a travesty
of bis later practice of thinking against himself. The full story of what happened
is in the letters to Beauvoir, to whom Sartre regularly confided the troubles
encountered in his "contingent" love affairs with other women: the Diaries also
make cryptic reference to it. Briefly, the crisis was precipitated when Martine
Bourdin, witb whom Sartre bad enjoyed a prolonged affair same months earlier,
showOO some of his love letters to a male acquaintance of Sartre's new mistress,
Tania. Martine had addOO an unflattering oral description of Sartre's sexual
practices, and all of this had been relayed to Tania, who now not only feit that
she had been betrayOO but lookOO on Sartre, as he bimself expressed it, as "an
obscene goat." (C, p. 295. WD, p. 242) Parenthetically, I note that Sartre's
shockOO realization of how he appearOO to others, his confused sense of
irremOOiably having to recognize that he was this self that others saw while at
the same time he was free to not be it-all this must certainly have contributed
to the devastating look described in Being and Nothingness. But what concems
me here is Sartre's own action and the attitude he took toward it. Furious with
Martine, he wrote a letter to her in which he repainted the history of bis entire
relation with her in the most disgusting tenns. This letter he sent to Tania,
asking her to read it and then mail it on to Martine. Even that request was in
bad faith, for Sartre thought that Tania would find reasons not to do so, and he
profoundly hoped that she would not. Later he condemnOO his conduct in the
harshest tenns. "I am very thoroughly disgustOO with myself." (11. p. 92) "I
very profoundly and sincerely feel myself to be un salaud." (11. p. 94) Yet his
regret is tinged with a kind of wistful pride that he had been able to commit the
infamy. The night that he wrote the letter to Martine, he recordOO in his diary,
"This evening (after a few Iibations, it must be said) I was gripped by a kind of
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rapture atthe idea of defending so just a cause. What has seduced me here is the
idea of action." (C, p. 285. WD, p. 242) Action, he observes, which as usual
used words as its instrument. Five days later he writes to Beauvoir,
The letter to Bourdin was abjecl. I ageee completel)'. But )'ou do not know lhe kind
of rlsping jo)' I found in being enough outaide of m)'sclf 10 do • filth)' thing. I have
often been a stinker negligentl)' and frivoloual)', but I have never done the kind of
absolute dirt)' trick that the sending of that letter represcnta. Up until now I have
alwa)'s been to cold to do it. (11. p. lOS)
To me this episode demonstrates the bankruptcy of the attempt to equate
authenticity with spontaneous action motivated purely by immediate desire.
Some persons, only superficially acquainted with Sartre's ideas, have indeed
tried to define authenticity as the decision to do that which one absolutely and
arbitrarily wants to do. lronically, Sartre has fumished his own example to seem
to support this charge and the pejorative judgement on Sartre that usually
accompanies it. Whether he specifically had tbis negative conclusion in mind
when he said that it was out of this experience that he developed his theory of
authenticity, I do not know. I suspect that he referred also to other positive
conclusions which were more far-reacbing ihan resolutions for his personal
Iife-although related to them. I believe that when he told Beauvoir that
henceforth he wanted to care more deeply about things and to take on
responsibility for seeing them through, he was drawing on reßections not
connected exclusively with the recent crisis but deriving from a second set of
associations with authenticity which he had been working through, those placing
value not on spontaneity, but on responsibility.
Having introduced the preceding discussion with Sartret s portrait of Pieter,
I turned now to his analysis of another of his comrades, the inauthentic Paul.
Paul had remarked, "Me, a soldier? I consider myself a civilian in military
disguise." Sartre comments,
This would be .11 very weil if he were not making himaelf. soldier, deapite his
resentment, b)' his volitions, his perceptionl, his emotionl. A soldier: that meana
taking on the responsibilit)' for carrying out the orden of his auperion, an accomplice
down to his anna which carry the riße, hil legs which march, • soldier in hil
perceptions, his emotions, hia volitions. Thercforc he penilll in fieeing what he ia
making himself, and this plungea him into a slate of miserable, diffuse anguiah. (C,
p. 142. WD, p. 112)
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There is some indication tbat tbis portrait of Paul is also a retrospective
self-portrait by Sartre.
He introduces the example of Paul in presenting the view that
consciousness, as a lack of heing, realizes its existence as the activity of making
itself bei consequently consciousness is self-motivating, must provide its own
self-justification. But "it is so difficult to live without heing in any way
justified." (C, p. 87. WD, p. 65) The need to make oneselfbe and weariness at
perpetual responsibility go hand-in-hand. ODe may take refuge in either of two
inauthentic attitudes. One may feel that freedom is simply swallowed up in
facticity, that one is a victim of circumstances, a consciousness buffeted by
external pressures like a piece of wood tossed about by the ocean waves. Or,
like Paul, one may deny the connection between consciousness' judgement and
one's facticity. Without using the term, Sartre has described the mechanism of
bad faith as playing on the two meanings of the verb to he, as failing to
acknowledge our existence as both facticity and transcendence. (C, p. 142. WD,
pp. 111-112)
Sartre points out that in someone (bimself, perhaps, but not Paul) the
anxiety stemming from his unacknowledged realization of a contradiction in his
basic hehavior rnight serve as a motive for a conversion to authenticity. what
would such a conversion be? ODe must suppress the flight. ODe must assume the
situation in which one finds oneself. To assume is not the same as to accept.
Sartre has no use for Nietzsche's amor lat;, which he considers just another
variation on bad faith. To assume is to take to one's account, to be responsible
for, to admit that whatever one is or does, one is without excuse. In words
virtually copied in Being anti NOlhingness, Sartre shows how the war that comes
is my war, etc.
But if authenticity is a vatue, it is not primary. It appears as a response to,
and in the context of, the fundamental search for the value of substantiality, of
existing as self-eause, what Sartre later callsthe desire to be God. Human
reality can no more discontinue the quest to be its own foundation, Sartre says,
than a cognitive consciousness can cease to posit the world. But it is possible to
carry on the quest authentically; one must "assume what one founds. If the aet
of founding is prior to the existent that one founds, as in the case of creation,
the assumption is contained apriori in the act of founding. [As when one makes
a pot, writes a book, or initiates a new social reform.]
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But if ... it ia Ihe efTort to found what already exi.ta in fact, the auumption mull
prccede Ihc foundinaa. an intuition which revcal. what onc i. foundillJ. • (C, p. 143.
WD. pp. 112-113)
An example here would be the South African who must decide what role he/she
will assume in the racial conflict for wbich he/she is responsible even though not
persooally the initiator. Or we might cite Sartrets OWD example from the
Crilique, the French colon in Algena who must intemali~ as part of bis project
the exploitative structure of the practico-inert laid down by earlier generations.
At the end of Being and NOlhingness, of course, Sartre implies that it might be
possible to live without the value of tbe self-eause and to substitute freedom in
its place. In the Diaries be seems to limit bimself to the view presented in the
section 00 "Domg and Having, " in Being antI NOlhingnas: that one must pursue
the self-eause, that to achieve it symbolically in various forms of creating or
appropriating is what provides concrete satisfaction in life, that the varying ways
io which one pursues it color and define the human person, and that such pursuit
is in DO way to determine, hence to destroy, freedom but rather to realize its
possibilities. In short, it is not the pursuit which is inauthentic but the belief that
one has reached the goal and need pursue no further.
In a later passage Sartre states that to be authentie is to call into question.
"And itts not enough to call into question; you must change.· (C, p. 269. WD,
p. 221) We note that autbenticity continues to require a willingness to break with
onets past, to effect a radical cooversion of onets projects and onets conduct.
On the other hand, what Sartre says toward the end on the Diar;es shows that
he no longer views authenticity as pure spontaneity or detachment as such.
"eastor correctly writes to me that genuine authenticity does not consist in
overflowing one's life on all sides, or in witbdrawing so as to judge it, or in
liberating oneself from it at every instant, but 00 tbe contrary, in plunging into
it and making yourself part of it." (C, p. 356. WD, p. 293). In place of this
freedom suspended in air he believes not that one ought to put down roots.
"Personality ought to bave a conlenl. It should be made of clay, and Itm made
of wind."
The full implications of the metaphor may be seen in another passage io
which Sartre compares himself to Katow, a character in Malraux's The Human
Condilion, wbo wheo laken prisoner, gives away the cyanide wbicb he had
counted 00 to protect hirn from torture.
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It seem~ to me that at that moment he is genuinely human reality beeause
nothing holds him outside of the world; he i. fully within it, free and defenseless. The
movement from absolute freedom to a diaarmed, human freedom, the rejeetion of the
poison [i.e., Sartre'. delaehment) ha. been effected for me thi. year and by the same
stroke, I now envi.ion my destiny al jinile. And my releamin, mUlt consist preeiaely
in feeling myself Win the fray, Wwithout defenae. The war and Heidegger have put me
on the right traek; Heidegger by showing that there wa. nothing beyond the projeet
by whieh human reality by itself realized itself. Doea thi. mean that I must let the Self
in again? Certainly not. But the selfne•• or totality of the for-itaelf ia not the Self, and
never1heless it is the person. BasieaHy, I am in the eourse of leaming to be a person.
(C, pp. 393-394. WD, pp. 324-325)
Like his character Mathieu, Sartre has at last discovered that freedom must
engage itself. A philosophical change has accompanied the moral development.
By now Sartre has concluded that individual character is not a deterministic
structure but is identical with the individual project. Instead of bestowing all
importance on pre-reflective consciousness, he recognizes the significance of the
ego as the object indication of what the for-itself has made of itself by inscribing
its being in the world. If the ego is the product of consciousness, it has at least
the value of a creative work in which extemal ingredients display the starnp of
consciousness.
Sartre attributes his awakening to Heidegger and to the war which taugbt
him the vulnerability of his concrete project. I think of the episode which I
mentioned earlier played apart as weil. Writing to Beauvoir after tbe event,
Sartre says that he feels sullied [saU] by it. He adds, "I thought that Dothing
could ever sully me, and I perceive that bis is not true." (11. p. 95) It was not
only the war that made inroads on his protective isolation.
In a kind of postscript to his reflections on authenticity, Sartre asked
himself whether his new view of engagement might entrap hirn in the spirit of
seriousness. With relief he quickly concluded that to make oneself aperson did
not mean to give oneselfthe "coagulated consciousness" ofthe serious man. The
spirit of seriousness assigns more reality to the world than to oneself and
measures one's own reality in terms of the world. But one is still a
consciousness. And "it is not possible to apprehend oneself as a consciousness
without thinking that Iife is agame." Sartre sums up in a reconciling statement.
To grasp oneself as a person is the very opposite of grasping oneself in terms of the
world. However authentie you are, you are nonetheless free-even more free than in
the ease of the ivory tower sinee you are eondemned to a freedom without a shadow
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and without exculC.... In renouncing the ivory towert I would like the world to
appear to mc in ill full, threatening reality, but for aU that, I dontt want my life to
cease to be agame. Thatt, why laubacribe entirely 10 Schillert, ,taternent: "Man i,
fully man when he i, playing." (Ct pp. 396-397. WO, p. 327)
Apparently now Sartre feels that one must play for higher stakes and be willing
to abide by the roles one lays down.
But what about eoneern for the other players? In the real world one cannot
play solitaire. For a time it was as if Sartre tried to do so and saw others ehiefly
as obstacles on the path to authentieity. It is elearly something of tbis kind that
he has in mind when he coneludes woefully that he had not been authentie when
on.Ieave in Paris and that it is easier to be authentie in wartime than in peaee.
Sartre considers the example of the soldier who has chosen to be authentie and
then is visited by his wife. He will aet differently in his relation with her
because he is different. Butthere will be a problem. Tbe one who bas been
expecting to fmd the inauthentie in us will "freeze us to the marrow by
reawakening our old live. This is an imposed inauthenticity against which it is
easy but painful to defend ourselves." (C, p. 270. WD, p. 221) In tbis context
Sartre's comments seem to me to point even beyond Being and NOlhingness and
to state the thesis of the Crilique. Resistance to the resolve to live authentically
does not eome from residues of inauthentieity left like patcbes of dirt on an
ill-dusted surface. It is simply that earlier relationships and prior situations resist
change like things. "They have become inslilulions. " They take on permanence
and even evolve outside the person. "These revolutionary ehanges wbicb are
translated into a stroggle against the solidity of institutions are not different in
nature from the ehanges that a politician wants to bring to social institutions, and
they eneounter tbe same resistances. " (C, p. 269. WD, p. 221) The unity
between the early and the late Sartre is already apparent.
Love
At a moment of depression Sartre declared that bis relations with others
were "an open wound." (C, p. 302. WO, p. 248) The section on relations with
others, in the Diaries, though brief, is very close to the chapter on "Concrete
Relations with Others" in Being and NOlhingness, conceptually and even
verbally. It centers on love as the project of wanting to be loved. He says
explieitly that tbis is only one way of loving and that it is inauthentic. (C, p.
104
314. WD, p. 25~) He adds, "I have painted myself to the Iife in this
metaphysical description." (C, p. 318. WD, p. 261) And he provides an
autobiographical narrative to attach his own experience even more closely to the
preceding discussion. Yet while disavowing any attempt to describe all kinds of
love or even love as such, Sartre lays claim to some universality in his portrayal
of one of its unauthentic forms. His introductory statement makesthis clear. "In
every imperialistic feeling Iike mine, there is some sort of inauthenticity. But we
must understand what that means. 1 am struck this morning by that universal
demand: to want 'to be loved.''' (C, p. 310. WD, p. 255). Sartre's explanation
of why the lover wants to be loved follows along Iines familiar to us. Love is
not a project of enslavement. ODe doesn't want to be loved by an automaton or
by an Isolde-Iike victim of chemistry, nor by aperson dutifully fulfilling a
pledge to love. Then Sartre moves into the personal.
Nothing is dearer to me than the freedom of those 1 love. . . . Yes. hut this freedom
is dear to me on condition of my not reapecting it at aU. It's not a question of
suppressing it hut of actuaUy violating it. (e. pp. 311-312. WO. p. 256)
Obviously Sartre does not mean to resort to physical violence or mental cruelty
Iike the sadist. But his goal is perilously close to that of the sadist; it is that
previous moment when the beloved victim consents to self-surrender.
To teil the troth. for a long time-perhapl Itill today-I find nothing more moving
than the moment when the confession of love is finally wrenched for1h. And I think
today that what channed me in that confel.ion from the time I wal a child wa. the
.pellbound freedom from which it emanated. (e. p. 32S. WD. p. 267)
This inauthentic love, which Sartre openly labeled as a project of seduction, held
the same aim as all other forms of inauthenticity-the sense that one's existence
is justified-in this instance because the other finds one to be absolutely
necessary for her being.
1 do not wish to dweil, as Sartre does, on the detailed history of tbis not
very elevating enterprise and will confine myself to a fewobservations. First,
I note that Sartre wrote these entries exaclly at the same time that he was caught
up in the epis<rle involving Martine and Taoia, which had plunged hirn into an
unaccustomed seif-questioning with respect to his relations with others. In a
letter to Beauvoir, he remarked that it was his project of seduction that led hirn
to form relations which were not truly meaningful to him. Second, the
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distinctively Sartrean style of seduction involves personal characteristics which
Sartre does not hold to be universal, and wbich, except for a faint echo, do not
appear in Being and NOlhingness. (I refer here to the statement that the lover
seeks to captivate the beloved by making bimself a fascinating object and the
linking of love and language.) Sartre's means were entirely verbal. This was
partly, he says, because he feit bimselfto be ugly. Indeed he remarks that part
of his unending pursuit of wornen was so that he might possess vicariously the
beauty that he lacked-still another form of appropriation. Partly, also, he took
pleasure in bis own verbal performance. He actually campares bis seductive
activity with writing and calls each attempt a ·whole Iiterary labor.· Through
words he tumed an occurrence into a work of art, mush as Roquentin (in
Nausea) tried to create an adventure out of bis past experience.S But whereas
Roquentin realized that he had to choose between Iiving and telling, Sartre made
ODe the means of the other. More closely linked with the lover in Being and
NOlhingness, is bis statement that through words he wanted to interpose bimself
as the indispensable intermediary between the woman and the world. In the
Diaries Sartre expresses horror at the way he had actually tried to steal from the
woman her own way of looking at the world and to replace her perceptions and
feelings with his OWD. And he recognizes that he had regarded each woman as
raw material to be molded into a form in which he as creator might fmd his
image in the work he had created. Finally, 1 would say, Sartre's self-portrait of
bimself as seducer, combines the two attitudes toward the Other which is Being
anti NOlhingness he so carefully distinguished. This is not surprising since he
makes tbe point that one is Iikely to slip from one attitude to the other and back
again; in all forms of bad faith there tends to be a vacillation between the denial
of transcendence and the denial of facticity; the subject-object contlict is only a
particular exemplification.
To do Sartre credit, he concludes bis description with tbe statement that
be not only feels disgust retrospectively at this kind of behavior on his part but
realizes that he bad feit it all along, but bad hidden tbe feeling from himself by
SIn Ibia connection Sartre makea an amuainl rcfercnce 10 a failure. -For my seduction • relied
.olelyon my apeaking.• still remember my embarraumcnt in Berlin. I had set out rclOlved 10 know
Gennan women, but in a mon time I rcalized that I did not know eooulh Gennan to converae.
Stripped of my weapon, I remained quile atupid and did not darc to atlempt anything. I had to fall
back on a French woman.·
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satisfaetion at hi~ eonquests. Refreshingly he adds that althoughit had never
oeeurred to hirn at the time, tbe women might have been playing the same
eomedy, casting him in the reverse role.
The Diaries should put to rest forever the often beard argument thatthe
section ealled "Conerete Relations with Others" in Being anti Nothingness
describes love as it is essentially and inevitably. Yet despite Sartre's statement
in the Diaries that "there are other ways of loving," (C, p. 314. WD, p. 258)
he does not describe them. At no point does he even raise the question of the
nature of authentie love. He does, however, make same positive assertions about
the nature of friendship, wbieb indicate the possibility of relations in good faith.
Even more important, there is the fact of his relation with Simone de Beauvoir.
If we supplement the Diaries with material from the Letters, we see Sartre
sustaining an entirely different kind of love relation, one whieh he
unquestionably regarded as enduring and authentie. It is generally not eonsidered
fair to derive a man's theory from his practice, let alone from his love letters,
and especially if he is a philosopher. But given the intent of this paper, I want
to do something of the sort, partly so as not to leave the impression that Sartre's
emotional Iife was Iimited to what he himself denouneed as utterly inauthentie,
if not worse.
In the Diaries Sartre is naturally more reserved, but what he says is
signifieant. Only at one point does he even slightly suggest that he ever tried to
subject Beauvoir to his usual project of seduetion, and what he says here is
aeeompanied by a rueful reflection on himself. Confessing that part of his line
with a woman was first to warn her that she must never try to eneroaeh on his
freedom and then grandly to proclaim that he gave it to her as a gift, fully
expecting he would easily get it back from her, Sartre writes, "Onee I was
eaught at my own game. Castor aeeepted this freedom and kept. . . . I was fool
enough to be upset by that. Instead of eomprehending my extraordinary good
luek, I fell into a sort of depression." (C, p. 111. WD, p. 85) Castor pulled.him
out of his silly belief in salvation by arte (C, p. 102. WD, p. 78) And more than
onee, "Castor was right when she said, ... "
The letters eould weil support a full and riehly rewarding exploration of
the nature of the Sartre-Beauvoir relationship, far beyond the scope of a single
paper. Here I can only summarize and highlight the most obvious relevant
points.
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To start witb, the avid desire to share every detail and mood of each day,
simply for the pleasure of leaming or telling one another testifies to the deepest
mutual concern and to their will to have their lives thoroughly intermingled. It
is accompanied by a genuine wish for criticism from one another and willingness
to modify action in response to it. (For example, wben Beauvoir adversely
criticized a long prologue Sartre bad enthusiastically written for bis novel
trilogy, he jettisoned it, gratefully.) When he writes that their love is 'the only
achieved success in bis Iife, a ·perfection and arepose,· (I. p. 314) that
whatever good there is in him is due to her, (I. p. 359) we may sOOle at a
lover's exaggeration. But when he teils her repeatedly that she is the only
honesty of bis life, bis ·moral consciousness,· his ·witness· and his ·judge,·
the '''consistence of this person,· bis ·other self,· I think we are readmg the troe
signs of how Sartre Iivedthis relationship.
1 will not claim that it stands as a perfect model of wbat authentic love
sbould be-objectively or by Sartre's own erlteria. In bis avowal that she is bis
only honesty, Sartre is eontrasting bis absolute trothfulness to her with bis false
words to others. Worse yet, he has just confessed to ber 'tbat in a letter to Tania
be bad written that he would gladly ride roughshod over everybody, including
Castor, if it would somehow set hirn right with Tania. Fearing lest Beauvoir
migbt wonder if he Iied to her, too, he says,
Caslor, I swear 10 you thal I am altogether pure with you, If I were not, there would
no longer be anythiol in the world with reapect to which I would not be a liar. I
would lose myself in it (i.e., in the Iyioll. My love, yoo are not oo1y my life but also
the ooly the honesty of my life. (11. p. 110)
I tbink we can believe him, chietly because in view of what he confides, it
would be bard to imagine what he would want to keep hidden.
Sartre told Beauvoir that the war had made him even more foreefully
aware of how much she meant to hirn, of the irreducible and incomparable value
of their love. Clearly tbe distasteful episode involving Tania 'and Martine also
served as a revealing catharsis. Before it was over, he lived it as a crisis in his
relations with Beauvoir, ODe evoked solely by his fear that if she saw him as he
now looked on himself, some irreparable hann might have been done. I join rny
OWD to Sartre's self-reproaches for the way that he involved Beauvoir in petty
deceptions of other women, even wanting her to conceal from Tania, for
instance, the greater number of letters and the larger proportion of his leave
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time allotted to Beauvoir. What exactly ougbt we to think of his practice of
confiding in her the details of bis emotional response to otber women and the
vicissitudes of bis affairs witb them'? Is it honesty or insensitivity1 Botb, of
course. But I think a bit more needs to be said.
Waiting anxiously to bear Beauvoir's judgement on bis action in the
Martinerrania affair, Sartre writes,
I have the feeling that this whole period will be settled, ntified, interred only when
we two will have been able to talk it over. It'l neceasary for you to have I Iittle seal
Ind 10 Iffix I stamp 10 111 thlt I live. You are indeed my linie Ibsolute, you know.
Not metaphysicII, becausc I do my metaphysici by myself, like I grown-up, but
moral.· (I. p. 111)
What was tbe reality behind tbe lover's declarations: "You are my conscience,
my other self"; "Togetber we make one",?
This was a relation between subjects, of course, not a merging of
subjectivities. Ithink I can see that in a special sense it was for Sartre Iike a
relation with his own self or at least his second self. It was as though together
tbey bad constructed a common ego, though not to tbe exclusion of their
separate egos, a projection of a crystallization of themselves that each was
wilIing to support. In each person there was a trust in tbe other consciousness
great enough to insure tbat any new view it might offer deserved to be
considered a revelation of a true aspect of tbe world and the feeling that the
otber person could be counted on to protect one against the risk of falling iota
bad faitb, could do so by offering, as it were, one's own unclouded vision.
It is exactly in one's relations with oneself that bad faith arises, and Sartre
records in the Diaries an occasion when his appeal to his "moral consciousness"
was recognizably in bad faith. He wanted to apply for a Populist literary prize,
for the sake of the money, but feit uncomfortable about doing so since,he did
not favor the Populist party and disapproved of prizes on principle. Therefore
he wrote to Beauvoir, knowing that she would tell him to try for the two
thousand francs and that he would do so. It all bappened as he predicted, but
Sartre recognized that he had in effect substituted her judgement for his own;
reproached himself even as he wrote out the seventeen copies ofthe letter of
application. We are reminded of Sartre's remarks, in the lecture on
existentialism as a humanism, conceming the young man who came to him for
advice, carefully selecting the person he hoped would give the advice he wanted.
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Most of the time, however, I believe that Sartre's relationship with
Beauvoir did exemplify authentie love, or love in good faith. I find in it the
qualities which I have myself always thought to be the positive possibilities for
human relations in Sartrean terms, and wbich can be expressed by expending
Sartre's metaphor of the Look-the Look as exchange, in which each one not
only seeks to know and to respect the structures of the other's private world, but
to modify and enrich the structures of one's own in response; and the
looking-together-at-the-world, whieh is the personal equivalent ofSartre's notion
of common praxis in the Crit;que. The extant Diaries eontain no theoretical
discussion of authentie love or of human relations in good faith. One has to wait
for the Cashiers pour une morale for Sartre's explorations of reciprocity and
empathy.
One other antieipatory note is sounded if we look at the Diar;es as a
prelude. This is the ideal of transparency, wbieh Sartre reintroduced only in the
interviews of bis last decade. It finally became for him the aim of a
resocialization of such a kind that nobody would ever, out of fear or some other
inhibiting force, feel the need to hold secrets. In the Diar;es he speaks of it as
the factuality of his life as a student when he lived "publicly as a eouple," not
only with Castor, its highest fulfillment, but also in friendship with Nizan and
one or two others. Existence in such transparency was an "Olympian security, "
and "an overwhelming happiness-like summer." (C, pp. 331-332. WD.
273-274) Yet the Sartre of the Diaries worries lest bis ability to live without
secrets and to lead others to do the same might stern from bis own too great
pride in feeling no solidarity with his self, a detaehment that manifested itself
too often in a lack of warmth. Be that as it may, I think his predilection for this
transparency explains his almost total lack of reticence with respect to himself,
botb in the letters to Beauvoir and in the Diaries. Sartre says that he treated his
feelings Iike ideas and pushed them as far as they would go in order to explore
and to understand the possibilities within them. On prineiple he believedthat "a
man as not meant to look at himself but should always keep his eyes fixed
ahead." (C, pp. 175. WD. p. 139) By exeeption he devoted the months of late
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1939 and early 1940 to self-scrutiny. The ontology of Being anti NOlhingness is
the direct result of Sartre's decision to conduet an authentie analysis of bis own
being-in-the-world.
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